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The Exception That Swallowed the Rule: Fixing the Multiple-Victim Exception to 
Minnesota Statute Section 609.035 
 
By Benjamin J. Butler1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Consider the following situation: Dick and Jane are in a domestic relationship.  
During a heated argument, Dick strikes Jane several times, hits her with a broken beer 
bottle, and threatens to kill her if she calls the police.  Jane calls the police anyway and 
Dick is arrested.  The county attorney could charge Dick with several crimes: second-
degree assault with a dangerous weapon (the beer bottle)
2
; terroristic threats (based upon 
the verbal threat)
3
; and/or domestic assault
4
.  One prosecutor might focus the charges on 
the most serious crime.  Another might want to “throw the book at him” and file every 
charge supported by the evidence.  But no matter how many crimes the prosecutor 
charges, the defendant will probably only be sentenced on the most serious crime for 
which he is convicted. 
This is the result of Minnesota statutes section 609.035.  Since its introduction as 
part of the Criminal Code of 1963, section 609.035 has provided that a district court may 
impose only a single sentence for multiple crimes committed by a criminal defendant 
during the a single behavior incident.  The theory behind the statute is simple: 
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punishment for the most serious crime committed during a single behavioral incident 
incorporates punishment for all the less-serious crimes committed during the same 
behavioral incident.  Application of the statute not only keeps sentences rational and 
proportional to a defendant’s conduct, but also reduces the incentive for prosecutors to 
over-charge cases.  This is true because in most cases adding duplicative charges will not 
change the defendant’s total sentence. 
What if, however, during Dick and Jane’s argument, their neighbor Sally came 
over to see what was wrong?  After Dick hit Jane with the bottle, he turned to Sally and 
punched her in the face, knocking out one of her teeth.  In addition to the charges 
involving Jane, a prosecutor could charge Dick with third-degree assault for his actions 
against Sally
5
  But under the plain language and rationale of section 609.035, the court 
could not sentence Dick for assaulting Sally because that crime was committed during the 
same behavioral incident as a more serious crime: the second-degree assault of Jane.    
Almost forty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the second 
scenario described above required a different result than the one mandated by the plain 
language of section 609.035.  Thus was born the “multiple victim exception” to section 
609.035.  Where a defendant commits crimes during a single behavioral incident against 
multiple victims, a court may impose multiple sentences of up to one sentence per victim.  
Although the statute contained no such exception, the Court held that the Legislature did 
not intend to prevent the imposition of multiple sentences in such cases.    
                                                 
5
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The Court later added a caveat to the multiple-victim exception: the total sentence 
imposed under the exception must not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the 
defendant’s conduct.
6
  The purpose of this caveat was to maintain in multiple-victim 




The multiple-victim exception as it currently exists is problematic in several 
respects.  By allowing a court to impose without limit one sentence per behavioral 
incident per victim, the exception encourages the kind of over-charging and charge 
bargaining that section 609.035 was designed to prevent.  This is especially true in cases 
involving a multitude of victims.  More fundamentally, the exception is problematic 
because it was created by the Court, rather than the Legislature, and results from a rather 
dubious piece of statutory interpretation.  Because the exception is not moored to the 
language of a statute, it remains subject to change on a case-by-case basis.  Recently, the 
Court expanded the exception to, for the first time, affirm the imposition of more than 
one sentence per victim, and, in the same case, dramatically altered how a district court is 
to determine for which offense to impose a sentence.
8
  In addition, the “fail safe” 
provision of the exception – that the total sentence imposed not unfairly exaggerate the 
criminality of the defendant’s conduct – is not much of a fail-safe at all.  It is amorphous, 
difficult to apply, and leads to inconsistent results. 
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This article proposes that the Legislature should amend section 609.035 to address 
the problems with the court-created version of the multiple-victim exception.  First, the 
Legislature should amend the statute to allow for the imposition of multiple sentences in 
cases involving crimes committed against multiple victims.  Second, in keeping with 
Minnesota’s goal of maintaining a rational, proportional sentencing system, the 
Legislature should limit the district court to imposing no more than two sentences per 
behavioral incident.  Third, the Legislature should codify Minnesota Supreme Court 
caselaw holding that the court can only impose a sentence for the most serious offense 
committed per victim, using comparison of the statutory maximum sentences and the 
offense’s severity-level rankings under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to 
determine which of several offenses is most serious.  These charges will ensure that 
Minnesota’s sentencing system is applied consistently and even-handedly and that 
criminal defendants receive sentences commensurate with their culpability. 
II. SECTION 609.035 AND THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION. 
Minnesota statute section 609.035 provides, in pertinent part, that “if a person’s 
conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be 
punished for only one of the offenses.”
9
  The statute prohibits the imposition of multiple 
sentences for multiple crimes committed during a single behavioral incident.
10
  The 
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purpose of section 609.035 is to limit punishment for multiple crimes “to the maximum 
permitted for the most serious crime committed.”
11
   
In an early case interpreting the statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court explained 
its purpose: “to insure that punishment for a single incident of criminal behavior 
involving a multiplicity of violations will be commensurate with the criminality of 
defendant’s misconduct.”
12
   The drafters felt that the best way to ensure that punishment 
was commensurate with conduct was to limit punishment to just one crime per behavioral 
incident.
13
  This was true, the drafters believed, because “as a practical matter a single 
sentence will necessarily take into account all violations, and imposing up to the 
maximum punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all 
offenses.”
14
  The drafters were concerned that “permitting a series of prosecutions and 
sentences where a single behavioral incident constitutes more than one offense will 
‘exaggerate the criminality of the behavior involved and, in a sense, defeat the policy 
underlying the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.’”
15
  This legislative 
history shows that the single-sentence rule is not some accident of history or unintended 
consequence of another policy.  Instead, the prohibition against multiple sentences was a 
well-thought-out and rational policy decision by the Legislature. 
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 Id. (quoting Advisory Committee Comment, 40 M.S.A. pp. 58).  In addition to prohibiting multiple sentences, 
section 609.035 prohibits serialized prosecutions by requiring that all crimes arising from a single behavioral 
incident are charged in a single complaint and provides broader double-jeopardy protections than those afforded by 




Under section 609.035, a court may impose a sentence for only the most serious 
offense committed during a single behavioral incident.  In order to determine which of 
several offenses is most serious, courts should compare the actual sentences which would 
be imposed for different offenses, the severity-level rankings for those offenses under the 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, and the statutory maximum sentences.
16
  If those 
factors are identical, or if the crimes at issue are non-felonies, the court may consider “the 
nature of the offenses to determine which offense is most serious.”
17
  Using this method, 
a court imposing a single sentence can be sure that it is punishing the defendant for the 




The number of sentences imposed has significant practical consequences both for 
the total sentence imposed in a particular case and for subsequent cases.  In many cases, 
multiple sentences can often be consecutive to one another.
19
  An offender who has to 
serve two sentences consecutive to one another will almost always be in prison longer 
than an offender who does not.  But even if the multiple sentences are to be served 
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concurrent with one another, the imposition of multiple sentences can affect the total 
sentence.
20
  Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant’s presumptive 
sentence is determined by comparing on a grid the defendant’s criminal-history score 
with the severity level of the to-be-sentenced offense.
21
  The criminal-history score is 
made up of one point or half-point for each felony offense which has been sentenced at 
the time of the sentencing on the instant offense.
22
  In many situations, a court can use 
one of a defendant’s convictions and sentences from a single behavioral incident to 
increase his or her criminal-history score for a second conviction and sentence arising 
from the same incident.
23
  This sentencing practice is known as the Hernandez method 
and leads to increased sentences because the increased criminal-history score leads to an 
increased presumptive sentence.
24
  When the criminal-history score is increased, the end-
result presumptive sentence is likewise increased. 
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 Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 1.B.9; 2.b.1.e (2012).  Under the Hernandez method of sentencing, “when a defendant is 
sentenced for multiple offenses on the same day, a conviction for which the defendant is first sentenced is added to 
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As an example of the practical effect of the multiple-victim exception, consider 
State v. Patterson.
25
  Patterson was convicted of aiding and advising the drive-by 
shooting of T.D. and aiding and advising the second-degree murder of R.A.
26
  The crimes 
occurred during a single behavioral incident.
27
  The multiple-victim exception allowed 
the district court to sentence him for both crimes.
28
  Using Patterson’s criminal-history 
score of zero, the presumptive sentences for the offenses were 48 months in prison and 
306 months in prison, respectively.
29
  The district court, however, used the Hernandez 
method to increase Patterson’s criminal-history score from zero to one before sentencing 
Patterson for the murder of R.A.
30
  This, in turn, increased Patterson’s sentence from 306 
months to 326 months in prison.
31
  Applying both the multiple-victim exception and the 
Hernandez sentencing method not only caused Patterson to receive two sentences for 
crimes committed during a single behavioral incident but it increased the length of his 
total sentence by 20 months. 
Even if the imposition of multiple sentences would not increase the total sentence 
for a defendant in the case at bar, multiple sentences will adversely affect the defendant’s 
criminal-history score in subsequent cases.  For example, the imposition of concurrent 
sentences for two misdemeanor assaults might not affect the defendant’s total sentence in 
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that case, because non-felony sentences cannot be Hernandized and probationary and jail 
time is capped by statute.
32
  But in any subsequent cases, the sentences will result in the 
defendant receiving two misdemeanor units instead of one, which will get him or her that 
much closer to the four such units required to add a point to the criminal-history score.
33
 
Section 609.035 also helps achieve consistent and rational results in charging 
practices.  A person’s criminal behavior during a single behavioral incident might support 
one or multiple criminal charges.  Only the prosecutor can decide which and how many 
charges to level in a particular case.
34
  If a defendant could be sentenced for every crime 
he or she committed during a single behavioral incident then the prosecutor could 
determine the final sentence by deciding how many crimes to charge because a 
defendant’s total sentence could increase with each conviction.  In order to achieve the 
longest possible sentence, a prosecutor might be tempted to file duplicative charges, 
convictions for which would add nothing of value to a defendant’s culpability but could 
dramatically increase the presumptive sentence.  A different prosecutor, on the other 
hand, might charge the defendant with only the most serious crime committed during the 
behavioral incident under the theory that punishing the defendant for that crime will 
encompass punishment for all other, less-serious crimes committed during the same 
behavioral incident.  Because section 609.035 normally allows only one sentence per 
behavioral incident, prosecutors have little incentive to over-charge defendants because 
                                                 
32
 Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subds. 3-4 (2010) (defining misdemeanor as a crime punishable by no more than 90 days in 
jail and gross-misdemeanor as a crime punishable by no more than 365 days in jail); § 609.135, subd. 2 (2010) 
(providing for maximum probationary terms for misdemeanor and gross-misdemeanor offenses). 
33
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multiple, duplicative charges cannot lead to longer sentences.
35
  Of course, section 
609.035 does not limit or interfere with a prosecutor’s charging options; a prosecutor may 
charge however many offenses probable-cause supports.  But under section 609.035, the 
practical effect of such charging decisions is limited to punishing the defendant for only 
the most serious offense, under the entirely rational theory that such punishment will 
fully account for his or her criminal behavior.
36
 
III. THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION. 
 
A. The Judicial Creation of the Multiple-Victim Exception. 
The plain language of section 609.035 created a bright-line rule: one sentence per 
behavioral incident.  However, from the day it enacted the statute, the Legislature carved 
out exceptions to this rule.  When it was enacted in 1963, section 609.035 contained only 
a burglary exception to its prohibition on multiple sentences for crimes committed during 
a single behavioral incident.
i
  That is, the statute permitted punishment for a crime 
committed during the course of a burglary in addition to the burglary sentence itself.
ii
  
The legislature has amended section 609.035 throughout the past fifty years to provide 
several additional exceptions permitting multiple convictions arising out of a single 
behavioral incident.
iii
  These include exceptions for crimes involving ineligible people 
possessing firearms,
iv
 crimes committed while fleeing a peace officer,
v
 criminal sexual 




  The legislature also 
                                                 
35
 Of course, if a defendant commits multiple offenses during different behavioral incidents, a prosecutor may 
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defendant who committed several drug-sale offenses on different days and during different behavioral incidents).  
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committed during different behavioral incidents rather than during a single course of conduct. 
36




created charging-statute exceptions to section 609.035, permitting a court to impose 
sentences for offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident.
viii
  These include 
exceptions for kidnapping,
ix
 certain crimes against unborn children,
x
 crimes while 
wearing or possessing a bullet-resistant vest,
xi
 crimes involving the solicitation of 
juveniles,
xii
 crimes involving the use of police radios,
xiii




These exceptions reveal that the Legislature is well aware of how to make policy 
decisions that, in certain situations, multiple sentences for multiple crimes committed 
during a single behavioral incident are warranted.  The Legislature has never made such a 
decision regarding crimes against multiple victims committed during a single behavioral 
incident.  Instead, the Minnesota Supreme Court “created” that exception to the plain 
language of section 609.035.
37
  The decision leading to that creation presents a classic 
case of bad facts making at least questionable law.
38
   
Philip Stangvik suffered from mental-health problems and delusions.  Among 
other things, he thought his wife was trying to kill him by poisoning his food.
39
  Stangvik 
had a history of committing violent acts against his wife and children and, as a result, had 
been committed to and discharged from several mental institutions.
40
  In 1963, Stangvik 
was a patient at the Fergus Falls State Hospital.
41
  In May of that year, he was granted a 
                                                 
37
 The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the multiple-victim exception as being “court created.”    
See State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1983); State v. McAdoo, 330 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1983); 
State v. Wallace, 327 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn. 1982). 
38
 State ex rel. Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1968). 
39








series of three-day provisional discharges so he could visit his parents.
42
  During one such 
discharge, Stangvik stabbed to death his wife and two children.
43
   
As part of a plea agreement, Stangvik pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for 
killing his wife and to two counts of second-degree murder, one relating to the death of 
each of his children.
44
  The district court imposed three sentences: life in prison for the 




 On appeal, Stangvik argued, among other things, that the imposition of multiple 
sentences violated the then newly enacted section 609.035.
46
  His argument would seem 
to have merit, given that the district court imposed three sentences for crimes clearly 
committed during a single behavioral incident, a fact the Minnesota Supreme Court 
acknowledged.
47
  Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the imposition of multiple sentences.
48
   
The Court based its holding on two grounds.  Primarily, the Court concluded that, 
when it enacted section 609.035, “the legislature did not intend in every case to immunize 
offenders from the consequences of separate crimes intentionally committed in a single 
episode against more than one individual.”
49
  The Court did not cite any legislative 










 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that section 609.035 applied to Stangvik’s case even though it had not been 
enacted at the time of his offense.  Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 671-72. 
47
 Id. at 673.  Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, the Court went on to hold that “from a legal point of view [the 
murders] were totally unrelated.”  Id.  The Court did not explain how the three offenses committed during a single 




 Id. at 672.  The Court cited six decisions in support of this proposition, but none of those cases involved the 
imposition on multiple sentences for crimes committed during a single behavioral incident.  Id. (citing City of 




history to support its conclusion, but rather relied upon a series of cases in which the 
California Supreme Court interpreted that state’s single-sentence statute in a similar 
way.
50
  Essentially, the Court held that the policy behind the single-sentence rule of 
section 609.035, that a sentence for the most serious crime will encompass sentencing for 
all other crimes committed during the behavioral incident, did not hold true in cases 
involving multiple victims.
51
    
The Court also noted a second rationale for its decision: that the imposition of 
multiple sentences in Stangvik’s case “does not offend our sense of justice.”
52
  The Court 
held that when considering the propriety of multiple sentences under section 609.035, 
“much…depend[s] on the harm inflicted and whether multiple sentences would result in 
punishment grossly out of proportion to the gravity of the offense.”
53
  None of these 
concepts appear in the text of the statute.  Nonetheless, they seemed to influence the 
Court’s resolution of the question, which focused on the heinousness of Stangvik’s 
crimes.
54
  The Court also noted that the district court “was not insensitive to the severity 
                                                                                                                                                             
525; State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 124, 142 N.W.2d 635, 638; State v. Gladden, 274 Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d 
779; State v. Murphy, 277 Minn. 355, 152 N.W.2d 507; State v. Gaulke, Minn., 161 N.W.2d 662,).  The Court 
acknowledged that it had never considered the question presented in Stangvik.  Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672. 
50
 Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672 (citing, inter alia, Neal v. State, 357 P.2d 839 (Cal. 1960)).  The California statute 
provided that “an act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be 
punishable under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one.”  Neal, 357 P.2d at 843 
(quoting Cal. Penal Code 654).  In Neal, the California Supreme Court held that the California statute prohibited 
sentencing a defendant more than once for violating more than one provision of the same statute.  Neal, 357 P.2d at 844.  
However, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the court also held that a defendant who commits crimes 
against multiple victims may receive more than one sentence, because such a defendant is more culpable than is a person 
who commits multiple offenses against a single individual.  Id. at 844.  In 2012, the California Supreme Court reversed the 
portion of Neal which held that a court could not impose sentences for violations of different parts of the same statute.  
People v. Correa, 278 P.3d 809 (Cal. 2012).   
51
 Stangvik, 161 N.W.2d at 672-73. 
52




 Id. at 672-73 (comparing case at bar to hypothetical robbery, auto-theft, and kidnapping case and noting that 




of punishment” and that it “permitted” the two of the charges to be amended to second-
degree murder.
55
   
 From this disturbing case was born a new doctrine: the “multiple-victim 
exception” to section 609.035.  Under that exception, a district court may impose not one 
sentence per behavioral incident, but rather one sentence per victim per behavioral 
incident.
56
  The one sentence imposed was to be the sentence for the most serious crime 
committed against that victim during the behavioral incident.
57
   
Subsequent to Stangvik, the Court added to the multiple-victim exception a caveat: 
when a court sentences a defendant for several crimes committed against multiple victims 
during a single behavioral incident, the total sentence cannot unfairly exaggerate the 
criminality of the defendant’s conduct.
58
   The purpose of this exception to the exception 
was to maintain in multiple-victim cases some consideration into the proportionality of 
the sentence to the defendant’s conduct.
59
  Essentially, the “unfairly exaggerate” standard 
allows appellate courts to reduce sentences which the court deems too long, even if the 
sentence is technically permissible under the other sentencing rules.
60
 
B. The Problems With the Multiple-Victim Exception. 




 See State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Minn. 2000) (holding that court may impose “one sentence per 
victim”); State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn. 1997) (“one sentence may be imposed per victim in 
multiple-victim cases”). 
57
 See Johnson, 141 N.W.2d at 522. 
58
 See State v. Marquart, 294 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1980); State v. DeFoe, 280 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 1979).  
59
 See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 n.6 (Minn. 2009) (using “unfairly exaggerate” standard to refute 
suggestion that multiple-victim exception “did not incorporate notions of proportionality”) (citations omitted). 
60
 See, e.g., State v. Goulette, 442 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Minn. 1989) (holding that imposition of several consecutive 





There are several problems with the multiple-victim exception as it currently 
stands.  Application of the exception can lead to precisely the kind of charge-based 
sentencing disparities that section 609.035 was enacted to prevent.  More broadly, the 
exception is problematic because it was created by the Minnesota Supreme Court and is 
not tied to any statutory language.  This judicial usurpation of legislative power is 
problematic because, without a strong statutory foundation, the terms of the exception, 
and how it applies to a particular situation, are always subject to change.  This next 
section attempts to outline these problems in more detail. 
1. The Multiple-Victim Exception Allows for the Kind of Charge-
Based Sentencing Disparities That Section 609.035 Was Enacted to 
Avoid. 
 
The multiple-victim exception allows for exactly the kind of charge-based 
disparity in sentencing that section 609.035 was designed to prevent.  Consider, for 
example, the case of Michael Ferguson.
61
  Ferguson and his brothers Marcus and 
Matthew Dillard were in a van when Marcus fired several shots towards a duplex house 
in St. Paul.
62
  Matthew was the driver.  According to the Dillard brothers’ testimony at 
Michael Ferguson’s trial, Michael handed Marcus the gun Marcus used to commit the 
shooting.
63
  As it turned out, there were eight people inside one of the apartments in the 
duplex, including at least one sleeping baby.
64
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 See State v. Ferguson, 2009 WL 3172139 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (Ferguson I); State v. Ferguson, 786 N.W.2d 
640 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (Ferguson II), rev’d 808 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. 2012) (Ferguson III). 
62








Each brother was initially charged with one count of drive-by shooting of an 
occupied building and one count of second-degree assault.
65
  The Dillard brothers 




The state offered Ferguson the same deal.  But Ferguson pleaded not guilty and 
exercised his constitutional right to a trial.  On the eve of trial, the State amended the 
complaint to charge a total of nine crimes: one count of drive-by shooting and eight 
counts of second-degree assault, one count for each occupant of the duplex.
67
  Ferguson 
was convicted of and ultimately was sentenced for all nine crimes.
68
  His total sentence, 
reached after partially Hernandizing his criminal-history score and imposing some of the 
                                                 
65
 See Complaint, State v. Ferguson, Ramsey County File No. 62-K1-07-003463.  A person commits a drive-by 
shooting if he or she recklessly discharges a firearm at or towards a building; the sentence for the crime is enhanced 
if the building is occupied.  Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1e(b) (2006).  A person commits a second-degree assault by 
using a dangerous weapon to do an act intended to cause another person to fear death or immediate bodily harm.  
Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2006).  Under the second-degree assault statute, it matters not whether the person 
targeted by the assault was actually frightened or even knew about the act, and it matters not whether the defendant 
even knew that the named victim existed.  See State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1997) (where defendant 
fired multiple shots at a home; affirming convictions for second-degree assault of all six occupants of the home, 
including two sleeping children who did not know about the shots at the time and about whom defendant did not 
know). 
66 
The details of the Dillard brothers’ sentences are included in Ferguson’s Feb. 28, 2008, sentencing memorandum, 
submitted to the district court, at pgs. 4-5.  Marcus Dillard pleaded guilty to drive-by shooting under a plea 
agreement which called for him to receive a 48-month sentence if he appeared for sentencing and a 72-month 
sentence if he did not.  Marcus did not appear at the originally scheduled sentencing hearing, and he therefore 
received a 72-month sentence.  Matthew Dillard appeared for the scheduled sentencing hearing and was sentenced to 
41 months in prison. 
67
 See Amended Complaint, Dec. 17, 2007. 
68
 Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 589.  The district court initially sentenced Ferguson on the assault counts but not the 
drive-by shooting for a total sentence of 75 months in prison.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed his 
convictions but reversed the sentences, holding that the court should sentence Ferguson in accordance with the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2009).  Ferguson I, at *5.  In 
Franks, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant commits a series of crimes during a single behavioral 
incident, the court must impose sentence only on the single most serious crime even where imposing consecutive 
sentences on several less-serious crimes would result in a longer total sentence.  Franks, 765 N.W.2d at 77-78.  
Ferguson argued that under Franks, the district court should have sentenced him only for the drive-by shooting and 
not for the assaults.  On remand, the district court sentenced Ferguson for drive-by shooting and each count of 
second-degree assault.  The court of appeals reversed the sentences again, holding that the district court had violated 
section 609.035 and Franks.  Ferguson II, 786 N.W.2d at 644-45.  The Minnesota Supreme Court then reversed the 




sentences consecutive to one another, was 75 months in prison.
69
  The Minnesota 




The prosecution in Ferguson used the multiple-victim exception to do what 
section 609.035 was designed to prevent: use convictions for multiple offenses 
committed during a single behavioral incident to drive up the defendant’s sentence.  The 
prosecution used the exception to effectively charge-bargain with Ferguson and his 
brothers.  The Dillard brothers were able to avoid additional charges and additional 
sentences by pleading guilty but Ferguson, who elected to maintain his plea of not guilty, 
was not.
71
  If the Legislature intended to allow the late addition of multiple charges for 
offenses committed during a single behavioral incident to drive the total sentence, no 
such intent is evident in the plain language of section 609.035.  To the contrary, the 
language of that statute indicates that the Legislature intended the exact opposite. 
2. The Exception Was Born of Dubious Statutory Interpretation and, 
as a Result, is Subject to Change on a Case-by-Case Basis. 
 
The bigger and more holistic problem with the exception is that it was born of 
dubious statutory interpretation.  Because the exception is untethered to any statutory 
language, its terms and the details of its application to a given case is subject to change. 
a. The Judicial Creation of an Exception to a Statutory Rule 
Violated Principles of Statutory Construction. 
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 Id. at 589. 
70
 Id. at 592.   
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 In his appeals, Ferguson challenged his sentences on, among other grounds, the argument that they were imposed 
to punish him for exercising his constitutional right to a trial.  The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the sentences 




The judicial creation of an exception to a statutory command runs counter to 
several well-established principles of statutory construction.  
 First, section 609.035 unambiguously did not, and still does not, contain a 
multiple-victim exception to its otherwise bright-line rule.  This lack of ambiguity should 
have precluded the Court from inquiring into whether the legislature intended to allow 
multiple sentences for crimes against multiple victims.
72
  Ambiguity in a statute’s 
language is a threshold issue for any statutory interpretation.
xv
  That is, a statute is only 
subject to judicial interpretation when it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.”
xvi
  As such, an unambiguous statute presents no occasion for statutory 
construction or inquiry into legislative intent.
xvii
  The Minnesota Supreme Court did not 
follow this principle when it created the multiple-victim exception.  The plain language 
of section 609.035 did not then, and does not now, contain a multiple-victim exception.  
Moreover, the statute’s exceptions have been anything but ambiguous since enactment.  
In light of the statute’s unambiguous language, the Court should not have inquired into 
legislative intent. 
 Second, by creating the multiple-victim exception, the Court essentially added 
language to section 609.035 under the guise of interpreting it.  This is normally 
impermissible.  When a statute’s language is clear, a court is bound by the language and 
may not read into the statute a provision that the legislature omitted.
xviii
  This is true 
regardless of the intent or inadvertence of the omission.
xix
  Minnesota courts have 
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repeatedly held that decisions regarding statutes’ amendments are firmly within the 
province of the legislature, not the judiciary.
xx
  As such, the Court’s reading a multiple-
victim exception into section 609.035 where none existed was an overreach of the 
Court’s authority, which simultaneously undercut the legislature’s power.
xxi
 
 Third, the legislature’s failure to enact a multiple-victim exception to section 
609.035, in light of the numerous other legislatively created exceptions, indicates a 
legislative intent not to create such an exception at all.  Where the legislature is aware of 
its authority to create exceptions to a statute, and has exercised that authority, a court is 
barred from creating further exceptions.
xxii
   Such an action by the court violates the 
canon of statutory construction “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” or “the expression 
of one thing is the exclusion of another.”
xxiii
  The expressio unius doctrine reflects the 
inference that any legislative omissions in a statute are intentional, particularly when the 
language of the statute supports such an inference.
xxiv
  
 State v. Williams, provides an example of the application of the expressio unius 
doctrine.
xxv
  In Williams, the Court considered whether the Sentencing Guidelines 
permitted use of the Hernandez method
xxvi
 in calculating a defendant’s criminal history 
score when he was sentenced under section 609.035’s felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm 
exception to section 609.035.
xxvii
  The court considered the fact that the Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission had “carefully considered the applicability of the Hernandez 
method to sentencing in several contexts” over the prior thirteen years, creating specific 
prohibitions to its use.
xxviii




decided not to act,” and held that the expressio unius doctrine prohibited extending the 
exception for Hernandizing to felon-in-possession cases.
xxix
 
Like the Hernandez method, Section 609.035 applies broadly but with exceptions 
which have been gradually and periodically carved out by the legislature.
xxx
  In light of 
the legislature’s exemption of certain offenses from the one-sentence rule, its failure to 
exempt crimes involving multiple victims from the statute’s ambit implicates the 
expressio unius doctrine.
xxxi
  That is, the legislature’s silence on a multiple-victim 
exception creates an inference that it desired no such exception.
xxxii
 
Finally, the Court relied on its own policy opinion about the propriety of imposing 
multiple sentences in a particular case to create the multiple-victim exception.  In 
Stangvik, the Court affirmed the imposition of multiple sentences because such 
sentencing “does not offend our sense of justice.”
xxxiii
  Ordinarily, courts do not interpret 
statutes to conform to the Court’s policy positions;
xxxiv
 rather, policy considerations 
expressed in statute remain the province of the legislature.
xxxv
  Even where the language 
of the statute leads to an unintended result, it remains the prerogative of the legislature, 
not the courts, to correct it.
xxxvi
  Because it is for the legislature to determine policy 
implications in enacting and amending statutes, the court’s relying on its “sense of 
justice” to create the multiple-victim exception to section 609.035 was inappropriate.
xxxvii
 
b. Because it is unmoored from the language of a statute, the 
multiple-victim exception is subject to change on a case-by-
case basis. 
 
Because the multiple-victim exception is unmoored from the language of section 




for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court changed the exception in two dramatic ways.  
Before that case, courts applying the multiple-victim exception had affirmed the 
imposition of no more than one sentence per victim per behavioral incident.
73
  The Court 
had never before affirmed the imposition of more sentences than there were victims in a 
particular behavioral incident.
74
  But in Ferguson, a case involving at most eight victims, 
the Court affirmed the imposition of nine sentences.
75
  The Court did so by holding that 
drive-by shooting of an occupied building was a victimless crime.
76
  This result was 
unprecedented and was at least arguably contrary to previous Supreme Court decisions in 
this area.
77
  This expansion of the multiple-victim exception runs afoul not only of the 
plain language of section 609.035 but also goes beyond the point of the multiple-victim 
exception, which is to account for each person victimized during a single behavioral 
incident.   
Ferguson also changed the exception in a second dramatic way.  In Part II of its 
opinion, the Court held that the district court could impose sentences for drive-by 
shooting and for assault against the building’s occupants because the building’s 
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 See, e.g., Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d at 878; Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d at 453. 
74
 This was true even where the intended victim of an offense was not so clear.  In State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724 
(Minn. 1979), for example, the defendant firebombed a house in an attempt to intimidate a person the defendant 
thought was inside against being a witness against the defendant’s half-brother.  Id. at 725.  The intended target was 
not inside the house, but five other people were.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that the district court properly 
imposed separate sentences for one count of attempted witness tampering and five counts of assault.  Id. at 726-27.  
This was because each crime had a separate “victim” – the absent potential witness was the victim of the tampering 
charge, and each occupant of the house was a victim of his or her own assault.  Id. 
75
 Id. at 592. 
76
 See Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 591 (holding that victims of assaults who were inside building were not also 
victims of drive-by shooting at an occupied building); see also Id. at 594-96 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting) 
(disagreeing with majority for holding that drive-by shooting of an occupied building is a “victimless crime”). 
77
 See Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 597 (P. Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d at 427) 
(discussing case in which Court held that crimes without concrete victims did not qualify for sentencing under 




occupants were not victims of drive-by shooting.
78
  In Part III of the opinion, the Court 
wrote that even if it was wrong, and that “drive-by shooting at an occupied building [was] 
the most serious offense committed against each victim,” the district court still could 
properly have imposed multiple sentences for drive-by shooting and assault.
79
  This was 
true, the Court wrote, because the rationale behind section 609.035 – that punishment for 
the most serious crime committed during a behavioral incident includes and adequately 
accounts for punishment for all crimes committed during that incident – “does not hold 
true” in this situation.
80
  The Court opined that sentencing Ferguson only for the most 
serious offense committed during the behavioral incident “fails to reflect Ferguson’s 
increased culpability for committing an act of violence with intent to harm more than one 
person.”
81
  The Court then pronounced a new rule: when “a sentence on the most serious 
offense unfairly depreciates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct…the rule [that a 
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 Id. at 590-92. 
79
 Id.at 592.  Part III of the Court’s opinion in Ferguson is arguably dicta, because the Court affirmed Ferguson’s 
sentences in Part II of its opinion and therefore the discussion in Part III was not necessary to the holding of the 
case.  See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (defining dictum as “language in a decision not necessary to the holding”); see also Black’s Law 
Dictionary (9
th
 Ed. 2009) (defining “obiter dictum” as “A judicial comment made while delivering a judicial 
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be 
considered persuasive).”).  But the Minnesota Supreme Court has used a more narrow definition of dicta.  See State 
v. Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d 390, 395 n.7 (Minn. 2008) (defining dicta as “expressions in a court’s opinion which go 
beyond the facts before the court and therefore are the individual views of the author of the opinion and not binding 
in subsequent cases.”) (quoting State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (Minn. 1956)).  Part III of 
Ferguson III does not “go beyond the facts before the court,” Id., and therefore Part III is probably not dicta under 
the standard articulated in Timberlake. 
80
 Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592.   
81
 Id.  
82
 Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592 n.4.  The footnote actually referenced “the rule announced in Kebaso, 713 
N.W.2d at 322.”  The specific “rule announced in Kebaso” was that a sentencing court may not consider possible 




This new rule was unprecedented.  It also generates a host of questions: when does 
sentencing on the most serious offense “unfairly depreciate[] the criminality of the 
defendant’s conduct”?  By what standard should courts use to determine whether this is 
the case?  How much of depreciation must exist before the depreciation becomes unfair?  
To whom must the final sentence by unfair: the victim or victims, or the prosecution, or 
society in general?  If sentencing a defendant for the most serious offense “unfairly 
depreciates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct,” can the sentencing court choose a 
different offense on which to sentence the defendant, or can the sentencing court ignore 
section 609.035 altogether if the court determines that the rationale behind the statute 
“does not hold true”?  The Court did not address any of these questions or provide any 
guidance to lower courts on how to apply this new standard.
83
  But taken to its logical 
conclusion, the new rule of Ferguson III threatens to gut the protections of section 
609.035, or at least reduce that previously mandatory statute to an optional one based 
upon an exercise of judicial discretion. 
3. The “unfairly exaggerates” standard is insufficient to ensure 
rational and proportional sentences imposed under the multiple-
victim exception. 
    
Recall that when a court imposes multiple sentences for offenses committed 
against several victims during the same behavioral incident, the total sentence imposed 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d at 322 (“We granted review on the narrow issue of whether the court of appeals erred in 
refusing to consider the potential immigration consequences to Kebaso when deciding which sentence to vacate.”).  
It appears that the Court in Ferguson III was referring to Kebaso’s discussion of the then almost fifty-year-old rule 
requiring sentencing on the most serious offense per victim per behavioral incident.  See Minn. Stat. § 609.035 
(1963 Committee Comment); Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 520-21. 
83




cannot unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.
84
  This rule is 
designed to ensure that sentences imposed under the exception are proportional to the 
defendant’s conduct.
85
  But this rule is difficult to apply because the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has never set forth a specific standard for determining whether a sentence is 
proportional to or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of a defendant’s conduct.
86
  Not 
surprisingly, this lack of clarity can lead to inconsistent results.   
For example, in State v. Norris, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 
defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment plus a consecutive 300-month prison term, 
which was the result of imposing six consecutive sentences for crimes committed against 
multiple victims, unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.
87
  In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court focused not on the defendant’s conduct – shooting up a 
bar full of patrons, killing one of them – but rather on the number of consecutive 
sentences imposed.
88
  Other than noting that in other cases it had affirmed the imposition 
of two or three consecutive sentences but never six, the Court provided no guidance on 
why the sentences imposed in Norris were so unfair as to require reversal.
89
  But just six 
years later, in State v. Cole, the Court affirmed the imposition of six consecutive 
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 Marquart, 294 N.W.2d at 851. 
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 See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 606 n.6. 
86
 Sometimes Minnesota’s appellate courts use their “collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of 
criminal appeals” to determine whether the imposition of multiple sentences, or the total length of such a sentence, 
is unreasonable.  See State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing, inter alia, State v. 
Miller, 488 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Minn. 1992)).  Often this review involves comparing the facts and sentence of the 
case at bar to the facts of other, purportedly similar sentences.  See, e.g., State v. Vickla, 793 N.W.2d 265, 270-71 
(Minn. 2011).   
87








sentences for murder, assault, and kidnapping.
90
  In Cole, the Court focused not on the 
number of consecutive sentences but rather on the heinousness of the defendant’s 
conduct.
91
  The Court did not cite or distinguish Norris but instead relied upon a case in 
which it had affirmed the imposition of two consecutive sentences.
92
  Situations like this 
reveal that district courts have little guidance on when the imposition of numerous 
sentences under the multiple-victim exception will be deemed excessive. 
In applying the “unfairly exaggerated” standard, courts often compare the facts 
and sentences in the case at bar to the facts and sentences in other cases.
93
  But even this 
standard proves difficult to apply because courts often struggle with identifying 
appropriate comparable offenses, and individual Justice can view a particular sentence in 
dramatically different ways.  In State v. Poole, for example, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals reversed the imposition of six consecutive sentences, totaling 18 years, for 
several counts of fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offenses committed against 
separate victims.
94
  The court acted because “[d]espite the egregious facts, [the court 
found] it…troubling that Poole received a sentence (216 months) substantially greater 
than the presumptive sentence for felony murder (150 months).”
95
  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court affirmed the sentence reduction without much comment.
96
  But Justice 
Tomjanovich dissented from the portion of the opinion affirming the sentence reduction.  
In her mind, the original 18-year sentence did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of 
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  Justice Tomjanovich would have held that the reduction of the 
sentence “minimizes the criminality of his conduct,” and would have compared the total 
sentence to not one but rather 16 felony murders.
98
  Because neither the majority nor the 
dissent provided much rational for their respective opinions, decisions like Poole provide 
little guidance for lower courts on whether a particular sentence, which appears otherwise 
lawful, will be deemed unfair. 
In the next section, this article encourages the Legislature to step back into this 
arena and provide guidance to courts on how to sentence defendants who commit several 
crimes during a single behavioral incident. 
IV. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND SECTION 609.035 TO 
CODIFY THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION AND CLARIFY 
THAT THE EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT SWALLOW THE RULE. 
 
This article proposes that the Minnesota Legislature should amend section 609.035 
to codify the multiple-victim exception.  The Legislature should do so in a way that 
ensures that the exception will not be used as a charge-bargaining weapon; that the 
exception will not drive sentences to unreasonable lengths; and that the exception will not 
swallow the rule against multiple sentences or the rationale behind it. 
Before we begin, however, a quick word about legislative authority in this area is 
in order.  Under Minnesota’s constitutional separation-of-powers principles, “the power 
to fix the limits of punishments for criminal acts lies with the legislature.”
99
  The 
Legislature may use this power to limit the range of sentencing opinions available to a 
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judge in a particular case.  The Legislature has done so in many situations, including by 
enacting mandatory sentencing guidelines, mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes, and 
section 609.035 itself.
100
  Under these principles, the Legislature would act entirely 
appropriately by amending section 609.035 to account for, and/or to limit, the multiple-
victim exception.  This is particularly true because although the Supreme Court has 
contended that the multiple-victim exception stemmed from its opinion about the intent 
of the Legislature.
101




The multiple-victim exception is worth preserving, at least partially.  Imposing 
one sentence per victim can, in some number of cases, produce perfectly just sentencing 
results.  However, for the reasons discussed supra., the legislature should also limit the 
exception so that it does not swallow the rule or its rationale.  In order to do so, the 
Legislature could amend section 609.035 as follows: 
Subd. 7.  Exception; multiple victims.  Notwithstanding subdivision 1, when a 
case involves offenses committed against multiple victims during a single 
behavioral incident, a court may, subject to the limitations expressed herein, 
impose one conviction and sentence per offense per victim.  When proceeding 
under this subdivision, the court shall impose a sentence for the most serious crime 
committed against each victim.  The court shall determine which crime is most 
serious by comparing the statutory-maximum sentences and the offense-severity 
levels under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.  If those provisions are equal 
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 See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005) (holding that sentencing guidelines are mandatory); Bluhm, 
676 N.W.2d at 651 (upholding mandatory-minimum sentencing provision).  See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 
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 This is particularly true because “the statutory text is the authoritative statement of legislative intent.” Gassler v. 




or do not apply, the court may compare the nature of the offenses.  A court 
proceeding under this subdivision shall not impose more than two convictions and 
sentences per behavioral incident. 
 
 This type of amendment would address several of the problems with the court-
created exception.  It would codify the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decades-old, 
common-sense standard for determining which of several offenses is most serious.
103
  
The standard is easy to apply and, because it is largely objective, should lead to 
consistent and rational results by judges considering similar cases.  This kind of clarity 
will produce more consistent results.  Also, given that the Legislature and the Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission have spent decades making policy decisions regarding the 
seriousness of offenses – as expressed in statutory maximum sentences and severity-level 
rankings – there is no reason to not follow their respective leads. 
 By providing that the court “shall” impose sentence only on the most serious 
offense committed against a particular victim, the amendment should prevent Part III of 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Ferguson III from gutting section 609.035.
104
  
Recall that Ferguson III, the Court held the district court did not need to impose sentence 
on the most serious offense per victim if the court determined that doing so would 
“unfairly depreciate[] the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”
105
  The proposed 
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104
 The amendment would negate Part III of Ferguson III because it provides that the court “shall impose a sentence 
for the most serious crime” committed against each victim, and goes to describe how a court is to decide which 
crime is most serious.  The word “shall” imposes a mandatory duty.  See Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d at 652 (holding that 
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amendment replaces that vague standard with a clear, easy-to-apply statutory rule; a rule 
which will ensure that the defendant is sentenced for the most serious crime he or she 
commits against a particular victim.  The “most serious crime” rule has served Minnesota 
well since 1963, and the Legislature should make sure that the rule continues to do so.   
 The proposed amendment would replace the “unfairly exaggerates” standard with 
a more objective limit on sentencing: the statute should cap at two the total number of 
sentences a district court may impose under the multiple-victim exception.  This type of 
“hard cap,” or objective limit on the number and thus the length of sentences to be 
imposed, is much easier to apply than the current “soft cap,” which asks whether the total 
sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.
106
  Replacing 
the “unfairly exaggerates” standard with a two-sentence rule solves the problem of 
inconsistent results caused by the current soft cap, described above.  An objective two-
sentence rule is clearer and much easier to apply than the subjective “unfairly 
exaggerates” rule.  Because the proposed standard is objective, it will lead to less diverse 
sentencing results, one of the goals of Minnesota’s sentencing system.
107
  A two-sentence 
rule will also eliminate an incentive for the kind of charge-bargaining which occurred in 
Ferguson, because the prosecution will not have an incentive to load up the complaint 
with duplicative charges, which could result in multiple and longer sentences. 
Furthermore, the “unfairly exaggerates” portion of the multiple-victim exception is 
unnecessary.  In every case, an appellate court may review a sentence to determine if it is 
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“inconsistent with statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive, 
unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district 
court.”
108
  Appellate courts will be able to use this authority to reduce an unreasonably 




A two-sentence rule for the multiple-victim exception would be consistent with 
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions on determining how many criminal-
history points to assign a defendant who was sentenced under the multiple-victim 
exception.  The Guidelines provide that, when calculating a criminal-history score, 
“[w]hen multiple current convictions arise out of a single course of conduct in which 
there were multiple victims, weights are given only to the two offenses at the highest 
severity levels.”
110
  The purpose of this provision is “[t]o limit the impact of past 
variability in prosecutorial [charging] discretion,”
111
 which is also the purpose of the 
proposed two-sentence amendment to section 609.035.  While the Sentencing Guidelines 
Commission purported to be concerned about “past variability in prosecutorial 
discretion,”
112
 there is no evidence that such variability is only a thing of the past. 
The Guidelines rule is similar to the proposed amendment because both are 
concerned with multiple sentences imposed during a “single course of conduct” or 
“single behavioral incident.”  The Guidelines provision applies “to a situation in which a 
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crime or crimes are committed against multiple victims during the course of an incident 
which is limited in time and place,” a standard similar to the test for when multiple 
crimes were committed during a single behavioral incident for purposes of section 
609.035.
113
  Given the similarities between the two concepts, it is not surprising that 
appellate courts have looked to cases interpreting the “single behavioral incident” 
requirement of section 609.035 for guidance on what constitutes a “single course of 
conduct” under the Guidelines.
114
  The Sentencing Guidelines-based two-sentence rule 
has not generated any major controversial decisions or, indeed, much caselaw at all.  The 
lack of controversy surrounding the Sentencing Guidelines version of the two-sentence 
rule shows that such a rule can be applied in a fair, evenhanded way, and can lead to fair 
results. 
A two-sentence rule might be subject to a couple of criticisms.  First, a limit of 
two sentences might be deemed arbitrary.  This same criticism, however, would hold 
against any numerical limit on sentencing.  Almost any numeric limit on anything can be 
dismissed as “arbitrary.”  Why, for example, must certain second-time controlled-
substance-crime offenders serve six months in jail? 
115
  Why not a three-month term, a 
one-month term, or a nine-month term?  In addition, by equating the number of sentences 
which could be imposed with the already-existing two-sentence rule of the Minnesota 
Sentencing Guidelines, the proposed amendment would not be arbitrary.  Instead, the 
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goal of the amendment would be to make sentencing under the multiple-victim exception 
consistent with well-established sentencing law in a similar area.  Furthermore, following 
the lead of the Guidelines Commission is particularly appropriate because “on most 
issues, the [Commission] retains primary control over sentencing policy formulation.” 
116
 
A second, more valid criticism might be that under the two-sentence rule a 
defendant would not receive a separate punishment for offending against a particular 
victim.  One of the purposes of the multiple-victim exception is to account, in the 
punishment for a crime or crimes, for each victim.
117
  But even under a two-sentence rule, 
the total sentence imposed can account for all of the victims of a crime.  A court may 
impose a sentence of aggravated duration upon a defendant whose criminal conduct puts 
several people at risk of harm, even where the defendant is convicted and sentenced for 
several of the offenses.
118
  Thus, under the two-sentence rule a defendant who is 
convicted of multiple offenses against multiple victims might only be able to be 
sentenced for two of those crimes, but at least one of those sentences might be 
enhanceable because of the existence of other victims or possible victims.
119
 
Finally, the Legislature would legitimize and endorse the multiple-victim 
exception by codifying it.  Codification of the multiple-victim exception would neutralize 
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criticism, such as that in this article, that the exception itself is invalid.  More 
importantly, codification would finally moor the exception to a statute.  This anchoring 
should prevent the kind of case-by-case shift in application epitomized by Ferguson.  It 
would make the exception more readily apparent to practitioners and judges and would 
standardize its application.   
When it enacted section 609.035 fifty years ago, the legislature evinced an intent 
to not allow criminal sentencing to veer out of control, or to be subject to the whims of 
individual judges, or to change dramatically based upon the facts of a particular case.  Put 
simply, the legislature evinced intent to limit judicial discretion in this area.  Codification, 
and limitation, of the multiple-victim exception to the protections of section 609.035 
would legitimately re-establish legislative authority in this area; would protect criminal 
defendants from the kind of charge-bargaining that section 609.035 was designed to 
prevent; and would serve Minnesota’s laudable goal of maintaining a rational and 
predictable sentencing system.   
V. CONCLUSION. 
Sentencing in Minnesota is motived by two equally important concerns: that 
defendants should receive a sentence commensurate with their criminal conduct, and that 
similar defendants who commit similar crimes should receive similar sentences.  Section 
609.035 serves both of these goals.  The court-created multiple-victim exception to the 
one-sentence rule of section 609.035 does not.  Accordingly, the Minnesota Legislature 
should amend section 609.035 and create a multiple-victim exception which is simple, 




that similarly situated criminal defendants are treated similarly.  By acting in this manner, 
the Legislature will ensure that Minnesota’s sentencing system will continue to produce 
just results in future cases. 
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